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NOTE
ABANDONMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES IN
THE COURSE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Bankruptcy-Abandonment-Toxic Waste-Abandonment does not
excuse state environmental law violators from paying cleanup costs.
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection.
INTRODUCTION
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection' addresses the conflict between creditor interests and state
interests when a corporation violates state pollution laws prior to declaring
bankruptcy. The creditor interest is protected by Section 554(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code which provides for abandonment of the bankrupt cor-
poration's financially burdensome property.'
When the financial burden stems from the cost of cleaning up sites
polluted by the bankrupt's activities, creditor protection is plainly incon-
sistent with the state's interest in imposing financial responsibility on
those creditors.
FACTS
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed oil at Long Island
City, New York, and at Edgewater, New Jersey.' In June 1981, Midlantic
National Bank lent Quanta $600,000, with Quanta's inventory, some
equipment, and accounts receivable as collateral.4 During that month,
Quanta violated a specific prohibition in its New Jersey operating permit
by accepting oil contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), a
highly toxic carcinogen.' In response to that violation, the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) ordered Quanta to
1. In the Matter of Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696, 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted sub noma. O'Neill v. New York, 106 S.Ct. 755, reh'g denied, 106 S.Ct. 1482 (1986); In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub noam. Midlantic Nat'I Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §554(a) (1982). See infra note 10 and accom-
panying text.
3. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 757 (1986).
4. Id.
5. Id. The court did not specify exactly what state law(s) were violated in either the New York
or New Jersey cases.
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cease operating the New Jersey site and to clean it up. Before concluding
negotiations on the cleanup of the New Jersey site, Quanta filed a petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.6
The next day, the NJDEP once more ordered Quanta to clean up the New
Jersey site.7 A month later, Quanta converted the reorganization action
into a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, a trustee was appointed.'
Soon after Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the New
York site revealed additional PCB-contaminated oil. Quanta's trustee
unsuccessfully tried to sell that site.9 When those efforts failed, the trustee
decided to abandon the site under Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
because the estimated cost of cleaning up this site exceeded the property's
value. Section 554(a) provides: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee
may abandon any property of the estate that is [financially] burdensome
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." o
After the abandonment, the city and state of New York (New York)
partially decontaminated the site for $2.5 million." New York also pro-
vided security to keep the public out of the site and set up a fire-suppres-
sion system.' 2
New York, as a creditor, sued Quanta in Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey to recover its cleanup and security expenses. The
bankruptcy court approved of Quanta's abandonment and disallowed New
York's expenses.' 3 New York then appealed to the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey. 4 The District Court also approved Quanta's
abandonment.
Shortly after the District Court rendered its decision, Quanta's trustee
6. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, It U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982). When a corporation is near insolvency
or is bankrupt, it "reorganizes" into a new corporation. A business plan is made whereby the new
corporation buys the old corporation's foreclosed mortgages. See e.g. People ex rel. Barrett v.
Halsted St. State Bank, 295 I11. App. 193, 14 N.E.2d 872, 877 (1938); De Blois v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 36 F.2d 1I, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1929); Symmes v. Union Trust Co. of New York, 60
F. 830, 870 (9th Cir. 1894).
7. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 757.
8. id. at 757-58. When a corporation distributes its assets to its creditors in the form of cash, it
liquidates its assets. Wilson v. Supreme Court in and for Santa Clara County, 2 Cal. 2d 632, 43
P.2d 286, 288 (1935). A trustee is a disinterested person who must fulfill certain statutory duties
regarding the bankrupt's estate. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, I1 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704, 1302,
1146, and 1106 (1981).
9. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 758.
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). A trustee may abandon property in a
bankruptcy proceeding when the property reduces the value of available assets. Those assets will
be distributed to the debtor's creditors. The goal is to repay the creditors the highest possible
percentage of the debts owed to them.
11. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 758.
12. Id.
13. id.
14. Id. A direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals from the bankruptcy court occurs when both
parties consent to it. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. App. Bankruptcy Rule 8006 (1982).
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gave notice of his intention to abandon the New Jersey site as well." In
response to Quanta's announcement of intent to abandon the New Jersey
site, the NJDEP requested the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court to grant an
injunction requiring Quanta to clean up the site. The court denied the
request. 6
The New York and New Jersey cases were joined at the appellate level.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower courts'
decisions and found that Congress intended that abandonment contain an
implicit public policy limitation.' 7 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that Quanta could not
abandon the New York and New Jersey sites,' The Court further held
that a trustee in bankruptcy can abandon property under Section 554(a)
of the Code only if the abandonment does not conflict with state statutes
or regulations reasonably written to protect the public health or safety
from identified harms.' 9
BACKGROUND OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Bankruptcy law is federal law. The United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States. "' Under this power, Congress has
consistently enacted legislation for the primary purpose of giving bank-
rupts an opportunity to "start afresh. "2 Bankruptcy proceedings ordi-
narily serve a secondary purpose as well: to protect the interests of the
bankrupt's creditors. Once liquidation proceedings begin, the bankrupt's
nonexempt property is collected and sold." The trustee in bankruptcy
distributes the cash from the sales to the creditors according to a priority
system.23
Before the enactment of the present Code, 4 Bankruptcy Rule 608
allowed abandonment of property only with the court's approval.2 Case
law also recognized the propriety of abandonment of the bankrupt's prop-
15. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 758.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 759.
18. Id. at 762-63.
19. Id. at 762. The Court does not elaborate on what it means by "identified" harms.
20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
21. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938).
22. Exempt property is property which the bankrupt can keep for his own. See Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 522 for types of exemptions.
23. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §507. There are seven priorities. They are
divided into administrative expenses and various unsecured claims.
24. The concept of abandonment was originally judge-made. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d
289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952). In 1978, Congress repealed the 1898 act and created the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, along with the current code. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
25. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.C. App. Bankruptcy Rule 608 (1982) [originally
adopted in 19731.
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erty under certain circumstances.26 The current Code is the first to permit
abandonment without prior judicial approval under most circumstances.
Judicial involvement in abandonment is required only when a dispute
arises over a proposed abandonment. When such a dispute arises, a
hearing is required. Absent a dispute, a proposed abandonment can be
carried out automatically without a hearing.2
THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 554(a)
In Midlantic, the Supreme Court was required to determine whether
Congress intended Section 554(a) to limit a trustee's power to abandon
financially burdensome property. The particular question was whether
abandonment could be permitted when it might compromise state envi-
ronmental laws. The Court also had an opportunity to answer the question
of whether some state laws which limit abandonment beyond Section
554(a)'s "financially burdensome" limitation are so "onerous" as to inter-
fere with bankruptcy proceedings.2' The Court, however, refused to reach
that question.29
To decide the question of whether abandonment can compromise state
law, the Court announced an operating premise: when Congress incor-
porates a judge-made rule into legislation, the new legislation retains all
of the judge-made rule's characteristics." If Congress wishes to change
those characteristics, it must do so explicitly." Since prior case law
recognized limitations on the trustee's power to abandon, the Court found
those limitations implicit in the abandonment power recognized in Section
554(a) because the law did not explicitly provide otherwise.32
The Court further supported its conclusion that Section 554(a) implicitly
limits the trustee's abandonment power by resorting to explicit language
in Section 362(a) of the Code and Section 959(b) of the Judiciary Act.
With respect to the former, the Court reasoned that Section 362(a) of the
Code expressly excepts "nonmonetary" judgments from its general pro-
hibition against creditors' suits against the bankrupt once bankruptcy has
been declared. 3 Since judgments which concern environmental protec-
26. See e.g. In re Lewis Jones, Inc., I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 7,
1974); Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d 289; In re Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1942). The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codified prior case law. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
27. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.C. App. Bankruptcy Rule 6007 (Supp. 1 1982).
28. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 759-60.
31. Id. at 760.
32. Id.
33. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, It U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1982). The exception to the automatic
stay provision reads in pertinent part:
(b) The filing of a petition [for a stay] . . does not operate as a stay-..
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such goverenmental unit's police or regulatory power...
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tion, safety, or state police power regulations are "nonmonetary," the
Court concluded that the stay provisions prevent trustees in bankruptcy
from using bankruptcy to avoid compliance with state laws.' With respect
to the Judiciary Act's Section 959(b), the Court found explicit direction
in the requirement that the trustee "manage and operate the property...
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State."'35
The Court also supported its holding that Section 554(a) limits the
trustee's abandonment power by relying on case law. First, the Court
described case law that developed prior to the codification of the aban-
donment provision and how those cases support a public interest limitation
on abandonment.36 Second, the Court discussed Ohio v. Kovacs,37 a case
decided after the codification of abandonment. The Court cited Kovacs
for the proposition that persons in possession of property, including bank-
ruptcy trustees, who violate state environmental laws must comply with
those laws.3
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
Although the Court's analysis is strengthened by its use of pre-Code
case law, the analysis suffers from several shortcomings. First, the Court
should have distinguished Kovacs from Midlantic, because Kovacs inter-
prets a different provision of the Code than does Midlantic. Kovacs also
illustrates an instance when the Court found that creditor interests out-
weigh public interests but that instance does not directly apply to Mid-
lantic. The Court has yet to clarify when other such instances of creditor
prevalence may occur. Second, the Court did not take into account the
plain meaning of Section 554(a) or possible alternate interpretations of
its legislative history. Further, the Court's reading of Section 554(a)
ignored another provision in the Code which expressly provides for lim-
ited abandonment in the context of railroad abandonments. Third, the
Court's analysis of the stay and Judiciary Act provisions was not con-
vincing.
34. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 760-62. The legislative history explicitly mentions environmental
protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws as circumstances under which a stay is not
granted. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342-43 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 51-52 (1978); 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5838, 6299.
35. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act of 1948, § 959(b), 28 U.S.C. §§951-63 (1982) [here-
inafter the Judiciary Act]. Section 959(b) reads in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title I I, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed
in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including debtor in possession,
shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or
manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such
property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof.
36. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
37. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
38. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 760.
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Federal Case Law
The Court's reliance on doctrines developed in federal case law incor-
porated in Section 554(a) supports a finding of a public interest limitation
on abandonment. The Court cites Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,9 In re Chi-
cago Rapid Transit Co.," and In re Lewis Jones, Inc.4 as examples of
judge-made abandonment that involved limitations which Congress incor-
porated into Section 554.42
In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the trustee in bankruptcy of a barge company could not abandon
barges.43 The plaintiff had petitioned the District Court of Maryland to
allow him to abandon floating barges anchored in a harbor." The district
court denied the petition because the abandoned barges would sink and
obstruct a navigable channel, in violation of a federal statute. 45 The court
of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision by balancing the duty
imposed by Congress in the public interest, the federal navigation statute
in that case, against the judge-made rule of abandonment.' The court of
appeals found that the public interest expressed in legislation prevailed
over judge-made abandonment.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., the Supreme Court held that the
trustee in bankruptcy of a transit company could abandon a branch railway
line only if such an abandonment complied with local law. 7 The municipal
ordinance in that case required the lessee to permanently operate the line
once it was built.48 The Court reasoned that the state's power to regulate
utilities outweighed federal common law abandonment powers because
Congress had not explicitly said otherwise.49
In the last case, In re Lewis Jones, Inc., the bankrupcty court held that
the trustee in bankruptcy had to seal underground steam pipes, vents, and
manholes before abandonment." Without sealing, this pipe system could
cause gas and water leaks, rat and mosquito infestations, and hazards for
both motorists and pedestrians.5' Although no state or federal law required
39. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
40. 129 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1942).
41. I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1974).
42. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 759.
43. Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290.
44. Id. at 289-90.
45. Id. at 290.
46. Id. Federal statutes replace federal common law when the two conflict. City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois and Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
47. In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1942).
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 5.
50. In re Lewis Jones, Inc., I BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1974).
51. Id. at 278-79.
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sealing the steam lines, the court invoked its power of equity to protect
the public from possible harm. 2
The state environmental statutes in Midlantic impose a duty in the
public's interest not to pollute in much the same way as the federal
navigation statute in Ottenheimer imposes a duty not to block navigable
passages so as to protect a public interest. The federal Bankruptcy Code
in Midlantic permits abandonment just as the common law in Ottenheimer
permitted it. Thus, Ottenheimer is analagous to Midlantic. The Court
uses the Ottenheimer analogy to support limiting abandonment to situa-
tions where the public's interest would not be harmed by it.
In both In re Chicago Rapid Transit and Midlantic, the states are
exercising their police powers. That police power encompasses the reg-
ulation of utilities such as the transit system in In re Chicago Rapid
Transit.5" The police power also includes the promotion and preservation
of the public's health and safety.54 In Midlantic, New York and New
Jersey used their police powers in legislating their environmental laws.
The underlying purpose behind state police powers is to serve the public
interest. Public interest, therefore, becomes the primary factor in refusing
to allow trustees to abandon property in both In re Chicago Rapid Transit
and Midlantic.
By passing an environmental law like the one involved in Midlantic,
a state legislature expresses a public interest in environmental protection.
On the other hand, when no law exists which expressly provides for
particular environmental protection, as in In re Lewis Jones, an inference
may be drawn that the public interest in protecting that particular evil is
not yet a high priority. Nonetheless, In re Lewis Jones treated the non-
legislated public interest in the abandoned steam lines as if it were as
important as a legislated public interest. In that case, the bankruptcy
court's own concern with the public's health and safety defined the public
interest. This demonstrates the importance of public interest considera-
tions, whether they are legislated or not. Midlantic itself is evidence of
the judicial trend to recognize public interest limitations on trustees'
powers.
Ohio v. Kovacs: A Need for Clarification of the Public Interest
Limitation
The Court also cites its recent decision, Ohio v. Kovacs, for the prop-
osition that a trustee must comply with state environmental law.55 How-
52. Id. at 280.
53. See York Water Co. v. York, 250 Pa. 1t . 95 A. 396 (1915).
54. See Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. United States, 666 F2d 834 (3d Cir. 1981).
55. 105 S.Ct. 707, 711-12 (1985).
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ever, the Court's reliance on this case is not well-founded. In Kovacs,
Ohio sued Kovacs for violating state environmental laws. Kovacs operated
a hazardous waste disposal site which caused fish to die, created a nuis-
ance, and polluted public waters.56 Kovacs had previously agreed to clean
up the site under a stipulation and judgment. He filed for bankruptcy
instead of cleaning up the site as stipulated and ordered.57
The Court held that Kovacs' obligation, as a debtor, to pay for the
cleanup costs of a hazardous waste disposal site is a debt subject to
discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.5" In dicta, the Court stated that
anyone in possession of a contaminated site must comply with the state's
environmental laws.59 Further, the Court said that Kovacs could be pros-
ecuted for those state violations.' Although Kovacs does not deal with
abandonment, the Court said that the state need not pay for the cleanup
expenses caused by violations of state environmental laws.6
The Kovacs Court identified only one instance where the creditors'
interest prevailed over the public interest.62 That instance involved the
debtor's ability to claim clean up costs as dischargeable debts. To fully
support its conclusion is Midlantic, the Court must articulate other cir-
cumstances that justify the conclusion that creditor interests outweigh the
public interest. The Court in Midlantic recognized that some state laws
imposing conditions on abandonment are so "onerous" as to interfere
with bankruptcy proceedings but refused to speculate about them.63 The
Court appears to be signalling that it will favor the creditor interests if
state law is too "onerous." But, if the state law is not very "onerous,"
it will favor the public interest. Surely, the states, debtors, and creditors
need better guidance. To clarify, when the creditor or public interest should
dominate, the Court should have first decided whether an "onerous"
standard applies to creditor/public interest conflicts. Then it should have
defined the standard of onerousness that results in subordinating public
interests to creditor interests.
56. Id. at 707.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 710. Under certain circumstances, claims against the debtor are not allowed and therefore
are discharged. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, I1 U.S.C. § 502.
59. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985).
60. Id. at 284.
61. If Quanta had heeded Kovacs, it could have avoided the cleanup costs from the New York
and New Jersey sites. Had Quanta begun cleanup procedures prior to bankruptcy or finalized its
cleanup negotiations prior to bankruptcy, under Kovacs, the obligation to clean up would have been
discharged. Quanta's creditors, therefore, would not have lost any additional money because of
Quanta's bankruptcy and environmental law violations.
62. Because Kovacs' debt was discharged, his estate did not have to pay the debt. Not having
to pay the debt, the estate had additional funds with which to pay Kovacs' creditors. Thus, the Court
favored the creditors' interests.
63. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
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A Plain Reading of Section 554(a)
Although the Court's analysis of the pre-Code case law supports its
finding a public interest limitation on abandonment, the Bankruptcy Code's
language and legislative history do not necessary do. Section 554(a) is
silent about limitations on the trustee's power to abandon based on public
interest protections. The only express condition placed upon abandonment
is that the property be "burdensome to the estate" or of "inconsequential
value."
Section 554(a)'s legislative history is not a helpful guide to its inter-
pretation. The legislative history of Section 554(a) neither supports nor
denies a limited abandonment theory.' Further, when Congress wishes
to protect the public interest over the interest of creditors, it has done so
explicitly. For example, railroads may be abandoned only when consistent
with the public interest.65 Congress' silence on a public interest limitation
in Section 554(a) is significant in light of its express recognition of limited
abandonment in the railroad provision. That silence may be interpreted
as a purposeful exclusion of limitations on abandonment.'
The Automatic Stay Provision
The Court's use of the automatic stay provision6' and the Judiciary Act
provision' as evidence that environmental concerns command special
consideration in the Code is not convincing. The stay provision exception
allows the government to enforce "nonmonetary" judgments when envi-
ronmental litigation takes place.69
The exception for nonmonetary judgments is consistent with the leg-
islative purpose of preserving the bankrupt's assets for creditors, because
nonmonetary judgments do not directly tap the bankrupt's financial
resources. On the other hand, to limit abandonment is inconsistent with
the Code. Limiting abandonment would drain the bankrupt's available
assets because of both the costs of maintenance of a nonprofitable site
64. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. 377 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2nd
Sess. 92 (1978).
65. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1I U.S.C. § 1170(a) addresses limited abandonment; how-
ever it applies only to railroads. It reads in pertinent part:
§ 1170 Abandonment of railroad line. (a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the abandonment of a railroad line if such abandonment is--(l)(A) in the
best interest of the estate; or (B) essential to the formulation of a plan; and (2) consistent
with the public interest.
66. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 766 (Rehnquist, J. joined by Burger, C.J., White, and O'Connor,
J.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court must read statutes as a whole and not construe statutory phrases
in isolation. U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (Ct. Cl. 1984).
67. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, I1 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5).
68. Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
69. H. R. REP and S. REP., supra note 34.
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and the costs of cleanup. Therefore, allowing limitless abandonment of
financially burdensome property would better further a major goal of
bankruptcy by aiding creditors in receiving all that the bankrupt owes
them.
The Judiciary Act Provision
The Court's reliance on the Judiciary Act provision is also misplaced.
The Judiciary Act provides that trustees "manage and operate estates"
according to state law.70 When a trustee abandons a site in a liquidation
proceeding, the site ceases to operate. In that situation, the trustee cannot
"manage" or "operate" the site, because there is nothing to manage or
operate." If there is nothing to manage or operate in an abandonment
situation, the question of whether or not a state law applies to that man-
agement and operation of the site is moot.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Midlantic held that abandonment could be denied when
the public's health and safety interests are affected in a sufficiently adverse
manner. The Court based its holding on its interpretation of Section
554(a)'s language, the automatic stay provision, the Judiciary Act pro-
vision, and on previous federal case law. Although the Court's use of
federal case law supports a theory of a limited abandonment power, the
Court must clarify what standards will be used in deciding when state
environmental laws are too "onerous" to allow public interests to prevail
in abandonment situations. Additionally, the statutory language of Section
554(a) and its legislative history do not necessarily support the Court's
holding. Furthermore, the connections the Court makes between the auto-
matic stay provision, the Judiciary provision, and Section 554(a) are poor
and therefore provide unconvincing support for the proposition that Con-
gress intended to incorporate public interest limitations on the trustee's
power to abandon financially burdensome property.
CHRISTINA HENDRICKSON
70. Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). In re Adelphi Hosp. Corp. held that in a liquidation
proceeding, a trustee is not a manager of an institution. 579 F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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